





The Law in Human Rights Theory 
Introduction 
This article pertains to meta-human rights theory and, more specifically, to the method 
of human rights theory. It argues that human rights theorists should take the legal 
dimension of human rights more seriously. They should start from some of the hard 
questions raised in current human rights law and practice, and not from ideal moral 
theorizing as most human rights theorists do, on the one hand, and then address them 
philosophically, an'd not only legally as human rights lawyers do, on the other. So 
doing, we should hope to bridge the gap between current theorizing of human rights 
by philosophers (even the most practical ones) and by lawyers: the former either see 
human rights law as a mere translation or enforcement of moral human rights (see 
Griffin 2008; Tasioulas 2010), or take it as a static and conservative reality that one 
can then morally reconstruct (see Rawls 1999; Beitz2009), while the latter's dogmatic 
discussions of human rights law do not easily embark into normative theorizing or, 
paradoxically, only by reference to certain kinds ofideal moral theorizing (see Clapham 
2006; Salomon 2008). 
1 
Of course, this suggestion may, at first, sound counter-intuitive to many moral 
and political philosophers who may expect to read a legal positive account of human 
rights and fear for the inherent morality of rights and theories of rights, on the one 
hand, and even banal to many legal philosophers who may expect to encounter yet 
another of the many attempts at systematically reconstructing the legal practice of 
human rights, on the other. The idea, however, is not to deny the moral nature of 
human rights, but to provide evidence of the normative function of the law of human 
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rights for moral human rights themselves. Nor is my goal to reject the moral nature 
of human rights theory itself, but only to show how legal theory and jurisprudence2 
should constitute our primary resource when accounting morally for contemporary 
human rights practice. 
Thinking about the nature of human rights theory is important for at least three 
reasons. First of all, so-doing it can situate itself within a broader set of theories, and 
in particular legal theory, democratic theory, or theories of justice, and can generate 
beneficial connections between them. Too often, human rights theorists fail to reveal 
those linb, and the credibility of their theories is partly undermined by the artificial 
severance of those connections given the centrality of human rights to human social 
and political life. Secondly, thinking about the nature of theory requires a preliminary 
darification of what it is a theory of and, therefore, of the nature of human rights. 3 
Such preliminary considerations can prove very beneficial in fully identifYing or at 
least delineating the object of one's theoretical endeavour. The answers to many of 
the important questions human rights theorists identifY as being central to human 
rights theory, and, in particular, the existence, function, content, strength, scope, and 
justification of human rights, are indirectly and often involuntarily conditioned by 
theorists' original characterization of the nature of their theory and its object. Moreover, 
because they do not delineate the nature of human rights and hence of the object of 
their respective human rights theory, many human rights theorists actually argue at 
cross-purposes. For instance, whereas, Charles Beitz and John Tasioulas claim to be 
disagreeing with each other, they do not actually refer to the same thing when they 
use the term 'human rights' and hence talk past each other (see Buchanan 2013a). 
Finally, some human rights theorists argue that human rights theorizing is part of 
human rights practice and of their object of study as a consequence. 4 This implies in 
turn that the nature of human rights theory should not escape their meta-theoretical 
attention, and that their account of human rights practice should be such that it can 
acknowledge the self-reflexive normative questioning and the moral critique that are 
immanent to legal practice. 
Of all areas of international law, international human rights law is the most likely 
to trigger questions pertaining to the role of morality or ethics5 in its practice, but 
2 I am not distinguishing between 'legal theory', 'jurisprudence' and 'legal philosophy' in this article. 
3 See Raz's reflections on the nature of legal theory and hence on the nature of law and of the concept 
oflaw, Raz 2009. 
4 Traces of this Dworkinian approach to legal theory may be found in Beitz 2009: 8-9, 212 (contra 105, 
though). 





also in its theorizing. This is because the content of international legal human rights 
and that of their moral correspondents are often taken to overlap. Or because their 
validity and justification is sometimes taken to transcend their legal enactment, at least 
on the face of international human rights instruments' preambles or judicial reasoning 
on those grounds (see Nickel/Reidy 2010; Besson 2014). Reacting too quickly to this 
moral dimension oflegal human rights, however, recent human rights theories seem 
to be focusing almost exclusively on the moral nature of human rights and see their 
relationship to the law as going one-way only: the transposition and implementation 
ways (see e.g. Nickel 2007; Griffin 2008; Griffin 2010; Tasioulas 2009; Tasioulas 
2010). Those few accounts that have distanced themselves fr?m this form of abstract 
ethical theorizing about human rights refer to purely political practices, of which the 
law is just one instantiation or where the law is treated as a static and morally inert 
reality (see e.g. Rawls 1999; Beitz 2009; Raz 2010a; Raz 2010b). As a result, most 
recent human rights theories have not only neglected the specifically legal dimension 
of human rights_aJid how the law contributes to the recognition and specification of 
human rights qua moral rights, but have also artificially severed the links between 
human rights theory qua moral theory, one the one hand, and legal theory, on the other. 
Most contemporary human rights theorists6 do not spend much time theorizing 
about the nature of their theory and, more specifically, about the legal dimensions of 
that theory.7This is surprising, as the concept ofhuman rights itself is usually regarded 
as being a moral, a political, and a legal concept.8True, human rights theorists disagree 
about whether human tights theory should be (in part or exclusively) about conceptual 
analysis.9 While one may understand why a moral philosopher or a political scientist 
6 I will be focusing on recent Anglo-American human rights theories in this article and in particular on 
Buchanan 2004; Nickel2007; Griffin 2008; Griffin 201 0; Tasioulas 2009; Tasioulas 2009; Beitz 2009; 
Raz 201 Oa; and Raz 201 Ob. 
7 In the German tradition, by contrast, important and influential legal or moral-legal theories of human 
rights were developed early on, and in particular: Alexy 1996; Habermas 1998a; Forst 1999, but those 
theories are theories of domestic human rights and those authors have found it difficult to transpose 
their theories to international human rights (see e.g. Habermas 1998a; Habermas 2004; and Cohen's 
critique: Cohen 2008: 599-600). There are a few exceptions to the absence of reference to law in recent 
Anglo-American theories of (international) human rights, a,nd in particular: Buchanan 2004; Cali/ 
Meckled-Garcia 2006a; Sen 2009a; Sen 2009b: chap. 17; Perry 2006; Letsas 2009; Cohen 2008; Forst 
2010; Buchanan 2013a. 
8 Raz 201 Oa: 336-7 focuses, for instance, on the use of the term 'htiman rights' in legal and political 
practice and discusses various conceptions. He claims, however, that he has not 'offered an analysis 
of the concept of a human right.' There is not enough discipline underpinning the use of the term 
'human rights' to make it a useful analytical tool, he argues. According to him, '[t]he elucidation of its 
meaning does not illuminate significant ethical or political issues' (emphasis added; 336-7). 
9 Following Raz 2009: 18, I understand concepts as intermediaries between the world, aspects of which 
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may not want to reduce human rights qua moral standards or political practice to 
legal rules and principles, understanding the legal dimension of those standards or 
practice and/ or their interaction with the law on human rights would seem to be an 
important part of the elucidation of their broader moral and political nature. 10 Human 
rights constitute a complex normative practice that combines moral, political, and 
legal elements, and all three ought to be accounted for. 
One explanation for the legal neglect in human rights theory may lie in a funda-
mental distinction made in all or most recent human rights theories: the opposition 
between the concrete practice of human rights and the abstract standards of human 
rights. 11 In fact, most human rights theorists identify that opposition as central to their 
account and situate the legal question in that opposition. They usually claim they are 
(also) writing about human rights as a legal and political practice and not (only) about 
human rights as abstract moral standards. Doing so, most of them want to distance 
themselves from a top-down approach and choose instead a practice-oriented or 
bottom-up approach (see e.g. Beitz 2009; Raz 201 Oa: 322-7), or what they sometimes 
refer to as a "middle-game" or "middle-level" approach (see e.g. Nickel2007: 3; Beitz 
2009: 127, 212). The problem with those "political" or practical theories, however, 
is that they usually fail to explain how they get to the moral stance from which they 
can then criticize their practical account. The other group of theorists does not fare 
much better, however. They have interestingly portrayed themselves as also writing 
from a bottom-up approach (see e.g. Griffin 2008: 29; Tasioulas 2009: 939). They 
are not regarded by their critiques as having succeeded to escape top-down theorizing, 
however, and are coined as "ethical" or traditional accounts of human rights (see the 
critiques by Beitz 2009: 7 fn. 12). When read carefully indeed, they refer to human 
rights practice at most as a test C¥e (seeTasioulas 2009: 939; Tasioulas 2010) for their 
theoretical proposal or as something to criticize or guide from that perspective (see 
they are concepts of, and terms which express them and are used to talk about those aspects of the 
world. . 
10 This is why the explanation according to which human rights theorists may actually not be talking 
· about the same thing as human rights lawyers and legal theorists of human rights fails: all human rights 
theorists factor in human rights practice at one place or the other in their account ofhuman rights and 
see the law as part of that practice. 
11 Other explanations may tange &om sheer ignorance or lack ofinterest about the law and legal theory, 
or scepticism about the legaliry of international law (including international human rights law); to 
strong views about the law's autonomy or non-autonomy from morality, or about legal rights' autonomy 
or non-autonomy from moral rights. While some or all those positions may be justifiable and apply 
depending on the author, spelling out their justifications would make ethical or political accounts of 





Griffin 2008: 204, 209-11). As a result, neither of those two approaches succeeds in 
bridging the gap between human rights standards and human rights practice. The 
former fail to explain how they can construct a human rights account from legal 
practice and then criticize it from an abstract moral stance. 12 And the latter are unclear 
about how they can focus on abstract standards distinct from human rights practice 
and then be faithful to the legal practice on that basis.13 
One of the reasons for human rights theorists' difficulties in bridging the gap between 
' stand;J.l'd and practice lies, arguably, in their failure to take into account the inherently 
legal ~ature of human rights14 or at least to understand it fully.15 They actually assume 
they have taken 'the legal dimension of human rights into account by making the oppo-
sition between human rights practice and human rights standards a central part of their 
theoretical poise on human rights. But what they have done in fact is reduce law to one 
side of the equation by conflating it with one of the dimensions of human rights politics 
or practice. No wonder, in those conditions, that human rights law is regarded by those 
authors as playing.a secondary role, if any at all, in human rights theory. It is important, 
however, not to confuse the relationship between abstract standards and concrete prac- · 
tice, on the one hand, with the relationship between human rights as ethical or moral 
standard~ and human rights as legal norms, on the other. It is true that human rights 
law can play a crucial role in the enforcement of human rights standards in practice by 
specifying human rights duties in concrete circumstances. 16 But it can also contribute to 
the identification and specification of those standards at an abstract level, either through 
the recognition of interests as sufficiently fundamental to give rise to human rights, or 
through the recognition of pre-existing moral rights. As a matter of fact, the difficulties 
that beset the opposition between bottom-up and top-down approaches, on the one 
hand, and the complex relationship between facts and norms in the legal practice, on the 
othet, are well-known to legal theorists. They have long learned to explain the law qua 
normative practice and to live with the tension between social facts and moral norms. 
12 This is one of the problems with the two-step approach used by Beitz 2008: 126-8. 
13 This is one of the problems with the notion of'lidelity' to human rights practice in Griffin 2008: 29; 
Tasioulas 2009: 939. Even a Dworkinian reading of that notion would not help here, as the two steps 
in Dworkin's conception oflegal interpretation do not correspond to a divide between moral reasoning, 
on the one hand, and legal reasoning, on the other (see Waldron 2009a: 12; Dworkin 1986: 256). 
14 See e.g. Griffin 2008: 191 who opposes 'philosophical theory' to 'legal practice'; Tasioulas 2007: 84-
5; Nickel2007: 32-3 who conflates the distinction between moral and legal rights with that between 
moral rights and enforced or enforceable rights; Sen 2009b: 364-6. 
15 See e.g. Beitz 2009: 209-12. There have been recent moves in the right direction, however: see the 
discussions of the role oflaw in recognizing human rights in Raz 201 Ob; and Cohen 2008: 599-600. 
16 The role oflegal human rights in this respect is best captured by Nickel2007: 45-8, 187-8. 
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It seems, therefore, that by not paying sufficient attention to the legal nature of 
human rights and by conflating the law of human rights too quickly with their politics 
or practice, current human rights theories miss on a central component of the norma-
tive practice of human rights, thus impoverishing their substantive moral account of 
human rights. Worse, they deprive themselves from essential theoretical insights about 
the nature of normative practices and, hence, of resources in their efforts to bridge 
the gap between human rights as critical moral standards and the political practice 
of human rights. Finally, they neglect the methodological experience and resources 
of jurisprudence and analytical legal philosophy. The point of this article then is to 
show how legal theory can provide a useful resource in the light of which many of our 
current discussions in human rights theory could be more fruitfully held.17 
My argument will unfold in four steps. In a first section, I will start by explaining 
why we should take human rights practice as our starting point in human rights theory 
and not the abstract moral reality of human rights, and in particular why we should 
focus on the legal practice of human rights. I will then move on to mapping current 
ethical and political human rights theories, and assessing how the legal dimensions of 
human rights have been underestimated in most of them. In the third section, I will 
challenge that very divide between ethical and political accounts of human rights by 
reference to the legality of human rights. To bridge the gap between those accounts, 
I will argue for a moral-political account of the nature of human rights and, on that 
basis, explain the intrinsic relationship between moral and legal human rights. Finally, 
in the fourth section, I will explain what a legal theory of human rights should look 
like and what its methodological characteristics should be. 
1 . From Human Rights Practice to Human Rights 
Theory: Law as the Missing Link 
A. HUMAN RIGHTS THEORY QUA THEORY Of A PRACTICE 
Human rights theory aims at giving the best philosophical account of human rights. 
The general aims of human rights theory are, in particular, understanding the nature 
and function ofhuman rights; determining the object, normative content, right-holders 
17 Even though the present article proposes a legal theory of human rights as legal norms, it does not 
claim to artificially separate law from moraliry and from politics. On the contrary, it recognizes deep 
and diverse relationships between legal validiry and legitimacy, on the one hand, and morality, on the 
other: see e.g. Raz 2003; Raz 2004. And this is clearly the case in the field of'rights,' as we will see. 
125 
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and duty-bearers of human rights; providing a justification of human rights and ac-
counting for the legitimacy of international human rights law; and, more generally, 
providing critical ,normative guidance to human rights practice. What human rights 
theory should do therefore is account for the current human rights practice, but also 
criticize it·at the same time. It follows that human rights theory implies focusing on 
the contemporary human rights practice as an object of philosophical enquiry. 
Of course, some human rights theorists may prefer to focus on the moral reality of 
human rights independently from their practice. They may want to explain human 
rights. by reference to moral interests and values and then to moral duties only. However, 
most of them do state that their philosophical endeavour aims at accounting for the 
contemporary human rights discourse. 18 It is the case, for instance, when they explain 
the content of international human rights law instruments or their legitimacy in the 
face of moral parochialism or exceptionalism. This is because few mpral philosophers 
would relish in speculating over abstract moral reality without any relationship to our 
daily life. This is_,~ven more the case when their object is one that has an eminent 
role in our daily discourse and practice. This is particularly important for moral 
entities like rights that create a normative relationship between a right-holder and a 
duty-bea.!'er. From the perspective of political philosophy, in any case, accounting for 
the moral features of politics without relationship to the practice and institutions of 
politics would be a pointless enterprise. At least, if one's aim is not ideal theorizing, 
but theorizing that aims at justifying, but also at fruitfully criticizing and guiding 
our political practises. 
True, some authors escape this debate by insisting that their human 'rights theory 
pertains to elucidating the concept of human rights within our contemporary human 
rights practice. There are many difficulties with this approach. One of them is that 
there are presumably many concepts of human rights at play in human rights practice 
at any given time and across history. As such, conceptual analysis is unlikely to be an 
easy task and to reveal much about human rights. It is better therefore to focus on the 
use of the term 'human rights' in legal and political practice. Another difficulty is that 
focusing on the concept of human rights is a way for some human rights theorists to 
18 See also Griffin 2008; Tasioulas 2010. To that extent, the dlvide between so-called "politi<;al" and 
"ethical" accounts of human rights is a substantive one (as I will explain in the next section), and does 
not pertain to the methodological dlvide between theories of the practice of human rights and theories 
of the moral concept or reality of human rights. Contra: Lafont 2012; Gilabert 2011; Valentini 2012 
who all take the "political" approaches to human rights as endorsing a practical methodology and the 
"ethical" approaches as embarking in pure moral reasoning without reference to the human rights 
practice. 
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retreat back to the moral dimension of human rights at the exclusion of their other 
dimensions in practice and hence to fall back into abstract moral theorizing of hu-
man rights. Finally, those human rights theorists thereby assume a ready and perfect 
correspondence between the legal concept of human rights, provided one single one 
can be isolated, and the proposed moral one. That correspondence is not granted, 
however, and needs to be argued for. 
In short, then, it is only by grasping the aims of contemporary human rights practice 
and by understanding its significance and distinctive functions that one gets to the 
interpretive material that will enable one to establish the nature of human rights. As 
Cristina Lafont explains, 'it is by understanding the point of the practice of human 
rights that we understand what human rights actually art (see Lafont 2012). The 
crucial question, then, pertains to the identity of the human rights practice one ought 
to account for philosophically and to how one may get to the point of that practice. 
B. HUMAN RIGHTS THEORY QUA THEORY OF A LEGAL PRACTICE 
Curiously, few authors have provided a dear account of what they mean by human 
rights practice (see, Beitz 2009; Buchanan 20 13a). It is 'usually described as a complex 
ensemble of political and legal practises. Some prefer referring to a discourse, but fail 
to explain what that discourse amounts to. Interestingly, legal theorists are used to 
the idea of practice and more specifically of normative practice. Mter all, the law is 
a normative practice where abstract moral ideas meet social facts and where both are 
in mutual tension and influence. 
Of course, some may say, and rightly so, that the human rights practice cannot be 
reduced to human rights law. They refer, for instance, to the anti-slavery or the femi-
nist movements whose human rights claims were not articulated in legal terms. One 
may quibble with those assertions, especially on historical grounds, however. The law 
was indeed always in the background of the claims made, at least as models for how 
to shape those claims. Moreover, even the idea of natural rights was articulated most 
effectively in practice at times at which it could also take a legal form, for instance 
through constitutional claims in the context of the American and French revolutions. 
and even before. In any case, it suffices for my purpose here to be able to ~how that 
human rights law is central to the current human rights practice, even if it does not 
exhaust that practice today or throughout the history of human rights. 
The centrality oflaw in the current human rights practice is easy to establish. Most 
human rights claims are articulated by reference to some legal basis in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, an international human rights treaty or in the decisions 
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of an international institution such as the UN Human Rights Council, the Human 
Rights Committee or a regional human rights court such as the European Court of 
Human Rights. 9ne may even observe a tendency to over-legalize human rights in the 
use of the idea of an international "bill of rights" when referring to the core internati-
onal human rights instruments, i.e. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the two UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Social, Economic and 
Cultural Rights. Thus, from the use of the idea in our daily discourse, we know that 
human rights are both a moral idea and a legal one. The same be said of other related 
idea;such as dignity (see Waldron 2012), for instance, or responsibility. 
As a result, -there are two ways of approaching a notion like human rights as a 
philosopher: either through law and the normative practice of moral ideas in legally 
institutionalized circumstances, or as a pre-institutional moral idea constraining the 
law and the practice (even imperfectly so) (see Waldron 2012). While the second 
approach may seem right to those philosophers who regard the law and generally 
political practice._..?s mere instantiations of morality, I would like to argue that the 
former is more correct: in most instances of ideas present in both law and morality, 
the law is not only constrained by moral ideas, but does also influence their norma-
tive scope and justification. The relationship between moral norms and their legal 
correspondents goes both ways, as a result: it is not merely a matter of translation, 
transposition or specification in the law (what one may coin the "one-way" view), 
but the law can also be a generator of moral norms and of moral normativity in social 
circumstances (the "two-way" view). In those cases, it is much more interesting and 
encompassing methodologically to start from legal norms and move back to moral 
ones than the reverse. 
This approach is particularly promising in the case of human rights, I would like 
to argue. Human rights do not usually enter our ordinary conversations about inter-
personal morality. And when they do, it is in relation to the law and to politics. For 
instance, human rights are usually explained in relation to social and political status, 
and status is a legal notion. They are also held to give rise to institutional duties, and 
this in turn implies a legal order. Thus, when human rights do enter our discussions 
in moral philosophy; this corresponds to little more than an appropriation of the 
idea by philosophers, for instance in order to make sense of other moral ideas such as 
justice, equality or democracy. If this is correct, the best philosophical approach is to 
start with human rights in the law, both domestic and international, and to account 
for them the way legal philosophers account for the law. This is what one may refer 
to as the jurisprudence or legal theory of human rights. 
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Of course, something may be a legal principle or right without corresponding to 
a moral principle or right. It may even be morally justified without having a moral 
correspondent (see e.g. Buchanan/Sreenisavan 2013; Buchanan 2013a). The danger 
then is that, by focusing only on the legal idea of human rights, one may miss our 
moral target. It is important to understand, however, that while legal human rights 
may be justified morally without reference to their corresponding moral rights, it is 
the mutual relationship between moral and legal rights in human rights that is most 
interesting morally. As I will argue later in this article, human rights are rights only 
when there is a correspondence between legal human rights and universal moral rights. 
The relationship between them goes both ways, as a result: human rights do not exist 
morally without being also legal, but so-called legal human rights cannot be regarded 
as human rights without a moral correspondent. 
This is actually confirmed in practice: international human rights law refers to the 
moral grounding oflegal human rights and therefore ties in legal human rights closely 
to moral rights or, at least, to morality (see also Buchanan 2013a; Gilabert 2011: 
449). This is the case, for instance, of the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights that refers to their derivation from human dignity. Interpretations of 
human rights by international human rights institutions are institutionalized forms of 
practical reasoning that serve moral values and channel moral disagreements. At the 
same time, however, the fact that human rights are said to be grounded in morality 
and interpreted as such does not make them exclusively moral in nature either, and 
their legal correspondents a mere transposition of moral rights. 
The truth lies in the middle, as it were. To quote Jeremy Waldron, the law contains, 
envelops and constitutes normative justifications and grounding doctrines and prin-
ciples: it does not just borrow them from morality (see Waldron 2012). Things that 
appear to be normatively "deeper" in the law are not necessarily purely moral: the law 
encompasses morality, and moulds and specifies it. The law is not morally inert and 
the normativity of law is a special kind of moral normativity: following Joseph Raz, 
one may say that the law has a double moral life to the extent that it may be both the 
object of a moral normative assessment and itself a source of moral norms (see Raz 
20 13). The law's pivotal role in the framework of moral normativity illuminates how 
human rights law may be both an object of moral assessment and, in turn, a source 
of new moral norms. It may be both an object of moral critique and a resource for 
moral reform, and all this internally to the legal practice. 
Evidence for this in the human rights context abounds. One may mention, for 





nical version of human rights and of their right-holders and duty-bearers, that helps 
us reach an intermediary stage of agreement in our moral disagreements about the 
relative importanfe of objective individual interests and hence about their recognition 
as human rights in the first place, and thus to focus our moral debates. Institutio-
nalized forms of deliberation about human rights are also provided by international 
human rights law, thus enhancing the epistemological quality of our access to the 
corresponding moral rights; one may think of the inclusive and egalitarian nature of 
those~processes of deliberation, but also of their independent quality in many cases. 
It follows that when we think philosophically about human rights law, we evaluate 
human rights law morally albeit by using its own immanent moral resources and standards 
(see Waldron 2012). As a result, accounting for our contemporary human rights practice 
requires neither purely abstract moral theorizing nor mere legal description, but what 
legal philosophers are used to do: theorizing the law in order to identify its immanent 
morality and hence the immanent critique within the law as a normative practice. 
The time has_c;ome to turn to the implications for human rights theory qua legal 
theory and for human rights law as a normative practice where human rights law may 
be evaluated morally by using its own immanent human rights resources and stan-
dards. I ~ill start with a critique of the role of law in current human rights theories, 
first, and then move to an argument about its centrality in our contemporary human 
rights practice, second. The implications for the method of human rights theory will 
then be unpacked in the final section of the article. 
2. The Law in Existing Human Rights Theories 
In this section, I would like to present the two main groups of human rights theories 
that have arisen in recent years. 19 Those theories have pigeon-holed each other as 
"ethical" and "political" theories of human rights. 
When presenting the accounts that fall in either category, my aim is not to do so 
generally or exhaustively, but to identify how the legal dimension of human rights 
is addressed within each of them. Interestingly, both ethical and political theories of 
human rights share a similar neglect for the legal dimension of human rights. This is 
surprising, as it is precisely the concern for fidelity to the practice of human rights, 
including, presumably, their legal practice that is said to lie at the core of their division. 
And it is even more surprising as some of those human rights theorists have developed 
19 The argument presented in this section is a summary of a lengthier argument developed in Besson 
201~. 
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fully-fledged theories of law elsewhere, or even, in some cases, a full theory of legal 
rights.20 Remedying the neglect of the legal dimension of human rights may actually 
help bridge the divide between those two groups of human rights theories, as I will 
argue in the third section. 21 
Because of the great variation of adjectives that have been used to describe and 
qualifY the different theories of human rights currently in discussion, it may be useful 
to clarifY how I will understand them here. The qualifications "ethical" and "political" 
have been used to oppose theories of human rights on three different issues: the nature 
of human rights, their function, and their justification.22 While it may have been the 
case at first that the theories that fell into either of those two categories did indeed have 
opposed views on those three central issues, views which could be qualified either as 
political or ethical, it is no longer necessarily the case. There are examples of human 
rights theorists whose view of the function of human rights is political to the extent 
that they give rise to duties for institutional structures only and not for individuals, 
but whose account of their nature and justification is ethical, thus providing for a 
moral-political account of human rights.23 Moreover, most authors realize now that 
the justification of human rights necessarily have to be both moral and political if it 
is to take the concern for public justifiability seriously, thus straddling a further line 
of divide between ethical and political accounts. 
In what follows, I will use those two categories to capture a difference of views 
pertaining to the nature of human rights exclusively, and not their function or justi-
fication. It is precisely with respect to the nature of human rights that the realization 
of their legal dimension is most instructive; not only does it bridge the divide between 
the ethical and the political conceptions of human rights, but it sheds light on how 
human rights law can both implement and shape human rights standards in return 
and, hence, on how ethics and politics interact in this context. This, in turn, necessarily 
impacts on the function and justification of human rights. 
A. ETHICAL THEORIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAW 
Ethical theories of human rights understand human rights as ethical norms that may 
or may not be legalized within domestic or international law. For those theories, 
20 This is the case in Raz 20 lOa. See, however, Raz 20 lOb. 
21 Other authors have argued for a combination of both approaches (e.g. Valentini 2012; Gilabert 2011), 
but not based on a legal argument about the nature of human rights. 
22 See on those uses, e.g. Tasioulas 2009; Tasioulas 20 10; Forst 2010. 






human rights law is only a concern in a second stage, once the existence and content 
of human rights have been clarified and need to be either legally enacted or enforced. 
I will look mor~ closely into one of the most influential ethical theory in this section: 
James Griffin's. 
James Griffin's book On Human Rights conceives human rights as universal ethical 
norms. He mentions the legal dimension of human rights briefly in section 2.1 and 
addresses it agairi in chapter 11 of his book (Griffin 2008; also Griffin 2001; Griffin 
2010). His argument is that there are discrepancies between the best philosophical 
(ethical) account of human rights (his) and international law's lists of human rights 
(Griffin 2008; 191-202). According to him, those discrepancies ought to be corrected 
by philosophers who can help international lawyers and judges, in particular, grasp 
the existence conditions of human rights, incorporate those rights into international 
positive law, or at least make their substantive meaning more determinate (Griffin 
2008: 204, 209-11). As a result, even though Griffin seems to be claiming that his 
account is bottg,m-up and starts from human rights practice, it does not seem to differ 
so much from a top-down approach that aims at correcting how the notion of human 
rights is used in social life (see Griffin 2008: 29).24 
Griffin's account of the legal dimension of human rights and his account of human. 
rights in general may therefore be deemed incomplete. To start with, Griffin locates 
the law exclusively in the practice of human rights, and he sees that practice as having 
to be aligned with the best philosophical account of human rights. This explains why 
he devotes a single chapter to the legal question, and a chapter that is situated at the 
end of the book, once his philosophical account of human rights has been spelled 
out. Another difficulty with Griffin's account of legal human rights, and one that 
is actually difficult to reconcile with the idea of law as practice only, has to do with 
what one may refer to as his closet natural law theory.25 It is not the applicability of 
natural law theory to human rights that is at issue here. Rather, the problem is the 
lack of argument for Griffin's take on one of the most difficult issues in legal theory: 
the relationship between legal validity and moral correctness, on the one hand, and 
between legal and moral reasoning, especially in the context of judicial reasoning 
about rights, on the other.26 Reducing legal human rights to a blanket incorporation 
24 See Beitz 2009: 7 fn. 12's critique to the same effect. 
25 See Griffin 2008: 204, in which the author discusses the 'incorporation' of human rights, and 203, 
in which he discusses the 'rule of recognition' of international human rights law. He then goes on to 
discuss its 'bindingness' (205), but the legitimate authority of international human rights law is an 
altogether different question fi:om that of their legal content and validity. 
26 See e.g. the recent debate between Waldron 2009a; Sadurski 2009; and Waldron 2009b. See also Raz 
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of moral rights into the law (see Griffin 2008: 38), and judicial reasoning with rights 
to moral reasoning, is too quick and simplistic, and a move even contemporary natural 
lawyers would not endorse. 27 
A third difficulty with Griffin's understanding of the legal dimension of human 
rights pertains to his downplay of the rights-dimension of human rights. 28 Since he 
does not conceive of human rights as rights that generate duties, the legal questions 
that usually arise out of conflicts of rights (and duties) and their claimability do 
not appear in Griffin's account. A final difficulty with Griffin's account of the legal 
dimension of human rights has to do with his understanding of the legal practice 
of international human rights. The authors he quotes as international human rights 
lawyers are either philosophers, or realist international lawyers who by definition are 
sceptical as to both the legality of international law (and human rights law) and the 
role of ethics in international law (and human right~).29 By obliterating the writings 
of mainstream human rights lawyers and international legal theorists, Griffin's line 
of argument comes dose to a Philosopher King's argument.3° 
B. POLITICAL THEORIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAW 
Political theories of human rights react to ethical accounts by understanding human 
rights not as universal moral norms - that would cover too many moral rights and 
fail the political reality test, they claim- but as politically adopted norms that consti-
tute recognized limits on state sovereignty in current international relations. Despite 
their sobering practice-based reaction to ethical accounts and in spite of their success 
in accommodating contingent factors such as the legal enactment of human rights, 
political theories of human rights ultimately pay very little attention to the legal 
nature of human rights. The first political account of human rights of this kind was 
Rawls's in his Law of Peoples in 1999. It has since been criticized and refined. One of 
the most recent political accounts of human rights will be addressed in this section: 
Charles Beitz's. 
Charles Beitz's recent book The Idea of Human Rights builds upon his previous 
2001, on the specific moral nature oflegal reasoning. 
27 For instance, Dworkin's conception of legal interpretation does not correspond to a moral v. legal 
reasoning divide (see Waldron 2009a: 12; Dworkin 1986: 256). 
28 See the critique byTasioulas 2010. 
29 See Griffin 2008: 309 fu. 18 (quoting Allen Buchanan on legitimate authority) and 19 (quoting Eric 
Posner on state interests). 
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work on human rights but also revises it to a certain extent (Beitz 2009, also Beitz 
2001; Beitz 2003; Beitz 2004). The book defines itself as a theoretical examination of 
human rights qua central idea to the international or global political practice ofhuman 
rights as it has g;adually emerged as a legacy of World War II. According to Beitz, 
human rights are matters of international concern whose violation by governments 
can justifY international protective and restorative action ranging from intervention 
to assistance. Beitz's political or practical account of human rights severs any link to 
morality and moral rights. 
In' this sense, Beitz's human rights theoty differs from its main competitors: ethical 
or traditional theories ofhuman rights as developed by James Griffin or John Tasioulas, 
on the one hand, and political or practical theories of human rights as put forward by 
John Rawls or Joseph Raz, on the other. It differs from the former in that the author 
does not regard human rights as a sub-set of universal moral rights, but as a sui generis 
normative practice that protect individuals' urgent interests against standard threats 
posed to them br.ffieir (state) governments, including failure by the latter to regulate 
the conduct of agents of which they are responsible (Beitz 2009: 109). Beitz does 
not, however, side with other political or practical accounts of human rights, despite 
sharing the same Rawlsian practical starting point. For him, human rights violations 
are not conceived as essentially triggers for international intervention, but only as a 
cause for international concern, which he understands as a broader protective' and 
restorative notion (Beitz 2009: 109). 
While one may be sympathetic to Beitz's practical approach and his definition of 
human rights as a normative concept to be grasped by understanding its role within 
the practice as opposed to an independent philosophical idea that would sit uneasily 
with the practice, one is left wanting more. More specifically, and although it is non-
ethical and political, Beitz's concept of human rights curiously seems to be a non-legal 
one. Mentions to the legality of human rights are limited to historical references to 
legal human rights instruments and hence to positive human rights law in the book's 
second chapter. This is regrettable on more than one count.31 
To start with, Beitz offers no detailed philosophical account of what he means by 
"normative practice" and legal theory may have helped in this respect. He describes 
human rights practice as being "both discursive and political" (Beitz 2009: 8) and, in 
a first approximation, defines it as "a set of norms for the regulation of the behaviour 
of states together with a set of modes or strategies of action for which violations of 
31 The discussion that follows is borrowed from a review ofBeitis book: Besson 2010. 
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the norms may count as reasons" (ibid: 8). He also says that human rights are a nor-
mative concept that plays a normative role in practice by asking for some kinds of 
actions (ibid; 9). Beitz states, however, that he knows of no good systematic method 
of interpretation for social practices and therefore has to proceed informally (ibid: 
1 07) .,This is surprising as the law has been famously and repeatedly described by many 
legal theorists as a normative practice. While Beitz is right not to equate human rights 
only with human rights law, the latter does constitute an important part of human 
rights practice and a part that is intimately connected to the other social and political 
dimensions of the practice.32 One may have expected therefore to learn from Beitz 
how human rights differ from law as normative practice and/ or how at least their legal 
dimension relates to their broader normative nature. True, Beitz mentions Ronald 
Dworkin's theory oflegal interpretation in a footnote. There, he says that he does not 
believe that that method is entirely suited for the task at hand, but cannot discuss the 
reasons for his position (Beitz 2009: 107 fn. 19). Beitz's model of interpretation and 
his so-called "schema" are very similar to Dworkin's, however (Beitz 2009: 107-8 and 
19). While Dworkin's theory may have deserved more than a footnote, there are many 
other elements in legal theory that pertain to the creation of norms through practice 
that may have come in handy in Beitz's methodological account. 
More precisely, legal theory could alsohave helped Beitz define the nature of hu-
man rights by comparison to other kinds of normative practices and, in particular, 
in explaining whether they are rights at all. First of all, if human rights practice is 
normative in that it can provide reasons for action, but is neither purely moral nor 
purely legal, Beitz has to explain in what sense it may be said to be normative, even 
in a sui generis sense of normativity (Beitz 2009: 197). This is at least the case if hu-
man rights are understood as more than prudential considerations. One may indeed 
question the possibility of the existence of reasons for action outside of either law 
or morality. Beitz defines human rights as protecting urgent or important interests. 
Even though he explains in detail what those interests are (ibid: 110-1), he is evasive 
about how one gets from those interests to a specific kind of moral entity, i.e. rights. 
Maybe Beitz's human rights are not rights at all, but it would be interesting to know 
why it is the case and why they are referred to as rights. If they are rights, it would 
have been useful to distinguish them in more detail from moral and legal rights and 
32 Some passages in ibid. (e.g. 40-2) seem to indicate the contrary, however. This is even more striking as 
the account of human rights Beitz puts forward (109) is largely geared towards the international legal 
regime ofhuman rights, in terms of right-holders and duty-bearers and of their normative consequences 
in particular. 
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their complex relationship. Some answers to those questions could be found in Beitz's 
views on the duties corresponding to human rights. When discussing the supply side 
of human rights, however, Beitz is very cautious and refers either to responsibilities for 
first-level agen~ or to pro tanto reasons for second-level agents, and only very rarely 
to duties (ibid: 115~6, but note 117). He states earlier on in the book, however, that 
"[i]t is natural to think of international human rights as atype of moral rights, and 
of moral rights as grounds for the assignment of duties to particular agents" (ibid: 
45). Clearly, if Beitz's human rights do not give rise to duties, or at least not in all 
cas~s in which they give rise to reasons for action, their nature as rights needs to be 
accounted for. Or else it is the concept of rights itself that needs to be fleshed out to 
accommodate those sui generis rights. 
An explanation for Beitz's neglect of the legal dimension of human rights may be 
found in the last few pages of the book where he discusses human rights as background 
norms of the global normative order (ibid: 209-12). There his reasons for distrusting 
the law become clearer, although they may be contested. 
To start with, Beitz seems to endorse Martti Koskenniemi's post-modern assessment 
of international law as "bent to the advantage of stronger powers" (ibid: 211). While 
one may share those concerns about. power in international relations, disparaging the 
whole international legal enterprise in one paragraph on that basis may be too quick, 
especially in the human rights field. International law has built-in correctives for one, 
as I explained before by reference to the immanent normative critique in legal practi-
ce. This explains how the international human rights practice may evolve and is not 
static; one may think, for instance, of the development of the extra-territorial effect 
ofhuman rights or of the possibility to hold international organizations under human 
rights duties and no longer states only. Beitz actually shows in the next paragraph 
that he is aware of those correctives and refers to them as international legal actors' 
"normative discipline." He quickly moves on to the human rights practice's internal 
normative discipline, however, claiming it is more inclusive, but without explaining 
how it may connect to the internal discipline of international human rights law itself. 
As a matter of fact, one may argue, following Allen Buchanan's interesting proposal in 
this respect, that international human rights' legal institutions may actually contribute 
to inclusive deliberation about human rights and hence to gradually weaken the bite 
of the cultural parochialism critique of human rights (Buchanan 2008). 
Another explanation for Beitz's lack of interest for the legal dimension of human 
rights stems from his binary approach to b9th law and morality: he sees human rights as 
either moral or practical, and as either legal or practical. This approach underestimates 
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the complex nature of most of our normative practices today, and more specifically the 
hybrid normative nature of the legal practice itsel£ While it is true that the content 
of international legal human rights is not legally determinate and the justification for 
their authority is not only legal (Beitz 2009: 21 O), these are two characteristics oflegal 
norms, and even more so of legal rights, that actually make them normatively rich 
and interesting. No one, not even an exclusive legal positivist, expects the law to be 
entirely determinate without references to morality and to generate duties to comply 
that are morally independent (see e.g. Raz 2003; Waldron 2009a). Furthermore, Beitz 
offers a skewed view of the law at times. For instance, he understands it as precluding 
disagreement and imposing dear-cut or uncontested inferences (Beitz 2009: 210-1). 
Again, modern legal theory has uncovered how the law channels disagreement and 
organizes agreements to disagree (Waldron 1999; Besson 2005). This is particularly the 
case with human rights that provide for intermediary agreements on the importance of 
certain interests, but at the same time leave many conflicts open and the specification 
of duties to further debate (see e.g. Raz 1984b: 208-9; Marmor 1997: 15-6; Besson 
2005: chap. 12). One may even argue that the legal guarantees ofhuman rights actu-
ally ensure that certain debates take place in society. 
3. The Nature of Human Rights: Moral and Legal 
Human rights can be understood, I will argue, as moral propositions, and more 
specifically as a subset of universal moral rights that ground moral duties. When the 
fundamental interests that found human rights are legally recognized, human rights 
ought also be described as legal rights. I will explain how those legal rights actually 
relate to the universal moral rights they recognize as human rights, but also modulate 
or even create.33 
Importantly, the morality and the legality of human rights are separated for the 
sake of exposition, but, as it will become dear from the discussion of their legality, 
they are two indispensable sides of the same coin and their relationship is not one of 
unilateral transposition, but a mutual one. 
A. THE MORALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Human rights are a sub-set of universal moral rights (i) that protect fundamental and 
general hum_an interests (ii) against the intervention, or, in some cases, non-intervention 
33 The argument presented in this section is a summary of a lengthier argument developed in Besson 
2011. 
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of (national, regional or international) public institutions (iii). Those three elements 
will be presented in turn. 
First of all, a human right exists qua moral right when an interest is a sufficient 
ground or reason to hold someone else (the duty-bearer) under a duty to respect that 
interest against certain standard threats vis-a-vis the right -holder (Raz 1984b: 195). For 
a right to be recognized, a sufficient interest must be established and weighed against 
other interests and other considerations with which it might conflict in a particular 
social.context (ibid: 200, 209). General vulnerability to certain standard or ordinary 
threats also has to be established in the given social circumstances. Once the abstract 
right is recognized, specific duties will be determined in each concrete case by reference 
to the specific circumstances and potential duty-bearers. Rights are, on this account, 
intermediaries between interests and duties (ibid: 208). 
Turning to the second element in the definition, human rights are unive!sal moral 
rights of a special intensity that belong to all human beings by virtue of their humanity. 
Human rights are..universal moral rights because the interests they protect belong to all 
human beings.· Qua general moral rights, they protect fundamental human interests 
that hum.an beings have by virtue of their humanity and not of a given status or cir-
cumstan~e (unlike special rights). Human rights are universal and general rights that 
protect fundamental interests. Those interests constitute part of a person's well-being 
in an objective sense; they are the objective interests that, when guaranteed, make for 
a decent or minimally good individual life. 
Of course, there has to be a threshold of importance at which a given interest is 
regarded as sufficiently fundamental in view of people's vulnerability to certain stan-
dard threats to give rise to duties and hence to a right. The fundamental nature of the 
protected interests has i:o be determined by reference to a context and time rather than 
established once and for all. What makes it the case, that a given individual interest is 
regarded as sufficiently fundamental or important to generate a duty and that, in other 
words, the threshold of importance and point of passage from a general and funda-
mental interest to a human right is reached, may be found in the normative status of 
each individual qua equal member of the moral-political community, i.e. their political 
equality or equal political status (see Forst 2010; Forst 1999: 48; Christiano 2008: 
138, 156). Only those interests that are recognized as socio-comparatively important 
by members of the community can be recognized as sufficiently fundamental to give 
rise to duties and hence as human rights. Aperson's interests deserve equal respect in 
virtue of her status as member of the community and of her mutual relations to other 
members in the community. The recognition of human rights is done mutually and 
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not simply vertically and top-down, and as a result human rights are not externally 
promulgated but mutually granted by members of a given political community (see 
Cohen}. 2004: 197-8; Forst 2010; Baynes 2009: 382). This is particularly important 
as it, allows for the mutual assessment of the standard threats on certain interests that 
deserve equal protection, on the one hand, and of the equal burdens and costs of the 
recognition of the corresponding rights and duties, on the other. 
As a matter offact, human rights are not merely a consequence of individuals' equal 
political status, but also a way of actually earning that equal status and consolidating 
it. Without human rights, political equality would remain an abstract guarantee; 
through mutual human rights, individuals become actors of their own equality and 
members of their political community (Cohen J. 2004: 197 -8; Cohen 2008: 585-6). 
Human rights are power-mediators, in other words:34 they enable political equality. 
Borrowing Arendt's words: 'we are not born equal; we become equal as members of 
a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights 
(Arendt 1951: 147-82).' This is in line with the republican idea of the political com-
munity qua locus of rights (Cohen 2008: 604 fn. 47). 
This brings me to the third element in the definition of human rights: human 
rights are entitlements against public institutions (national, regional or international). 
Human rights are rights individuals have against the political community, i.e. against 
themselves collectively. They generate duties on the part of public authorities not only 
to protect equal individual interests, but also individuals' political status qua equal 
political actors. Public institutions are necessary for collective endeavour and political 
self-determination, but may also endanger them. This is why one can say that human 
rights both are protected by public institutions and provide protection against them; 
they exist because of collective endeavour in order both to favour and constrain it. 
Of course, other individuals may violate the interests protected by human rights and 
ought to be prevented from doing so by public institutions and in particular through 
legal means. This ought to be the case whether those individuals' actions and omissions 
may be attributed to public authorities or not qua de jure or de facto organs. However, 
public institutions remain the primary addressees of human rights claims and hence 
their primary duty-bearers.35 
34 For the original idea of mediating duties, see Shue 1988: 703. See also Reus-Smit 2009. 
35 This normative argument actually corresponds to the state ofinternational human rights law that only 
directly binds states and/or international organizations to date and no other subjects {e.g. individuals 
and groups ofindividuals). The universality of human rights obligations does not imply the generality 
of the duty-bearers of the corresponding duties, i.e. a personal scope thar reaches beyond institutional 
agents whether domestic or international and outside a jurisdictional relationship to the right-holders 
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In short, the proposed account is moral in the justification it provides for human 
rights and political in the function it sees them vested with: they are indeed regarded 
both as shielqs against political authorities and as guarantees of political inclusion. 
In terms of justification, its moral-political dimension differs not only from accounts 
based on a purely ethical justification of human rights, but also from accounts that 
seek a political form of minimalist justification of human rights (Cohen J. 2004). In 
other words, the proposed moral-political account of human rights can salvage the 
political role of human rights without diluting their moral justification (see also Forst 
2010; Forst 1999, 48-50). 
B. THE LEGALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
It follows from the moral-political nature of human rights that the law is an important 
dimension of their recognition and existence, It is time to understand exactly how this 
is the case and to unpack the inherently legal nature of human rights. 
Just as mo.r.al rights are moral propositions and sources of moral duties, legal rights 
are legal propositions and sources oflegal duties. They are moral interests recognized 
by the law as sufficiently important to generate moral duties (see Raz 1984a: 12; Raz 
20H)b). The same may be said of legal human rights: legal human rights are funda-
mental and general moral interests recognized by the law as sufficiently important to 
generate moral duties. 
Generally speaking, moral rights can exist independently from legal rights, but 
legal rights recognize, modify or even create moral rights by recognizing moral in-
terests as sufficiently important to generate moral duties.36 Of course, there may be 
ways of protecting moral interests or even independent moral rights legally without 
recognizing them as legal "rights". Conversely, some legal rights may not actually 
protect pre-existing moral rights or create moral rights, thus only bearing the name 
of "rights" and generating legal duties at the most. 
The same cannot be said ofhuman rights more specifically, however. True, universal 
moral interests and rights may be legally protected without being recognized as legal 
"rights". But, as we will see, human rights can only exist as moral rights qua legal 
rights. Conversely, one may imagine legal norms referred to as human rights that do 
not correspond to moral human rights. In such a case, the legal norms named "human 
(contra: O'Neill2005; Lafont 2010: 203). See also Besson 2012a on this question. 
36 Legal recognition of human rights can therefore be taken to mean, depending on the context, both the 
legal recognition of an interest qua human right and the legal recognition of a pre-existing universal 
moral right as a human right. 
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rights" would only give rise to legal duties and not to moral (rights-based) duties. While 
this may be the case of many so-called human rights in practice, thus undermining 
the human rights-list's inflation critique (Buchanan 2013b), those legal rights only 
do not capture what is most characteristic of human rights law and human rights 
legal reasoning in practi9!. Legal human rights, in short, should only be regarded as 
rights stricto sensu when their corresponding duties are not only legal, but also moral. 
First of all, then, it is true that not all universal moral rights have been or are legally 
recognized as legal human rights. Some are even expressly recognized as universal moral 
rights by the law even though they are not made into legal rights or modulated by the 
lawY A distinct question, however, is whether they ought to be legalized and hence 
protected by law. Respect for universal moral rights ought to be voluntary in priority, 
and this independently from any institutional involvement. However, the universal 
moral rights that will become human rights create moral duties for institutions, and 
hence for the law as well, to recognize and protect human rights (Raz 2010b). This is 
the only way for them to give them their central egalitarian dimension, and to assess, 
for instance, whether the interests and threats at stake are general socio-comparatively 
and to specify and allocate the corresponding duties in an egalitarian fashion. In other 
words, while being independently justified morally and having a universal and general 
scope, human rights qua subset of universal moral rights are also of an inherently 
legal nature. To quote Jiirgen Habermas, "they are conceptually oriented towards 
positive enactment by legislative bodies" (Habermas 1998a: 183. See also Habermas 
1998b: 310-2). Thus, while legal rights stricto sensu are necessarily moral in nature 
(qua rights), human rights (qua rights) are also necessarily legal and they are as a result 
both moral and legal rights. 
Secondly, legal human rights may pre-exist as independent moral rights, but not 
necessarily. The law may specify and weigh moral human interests anew and hence 
recognize them as universal moral rights in the first place when recognizing them 
as legal human rights;38 One may indeed imagine certain political interests whose 
moral-political significance may stem from the very moral-political circumstances of 
life in a polity. Thus, the inherently legal nature of human rights and the role the law 
plays in recognizing given interests as sufficiently important in a group as to generate 
duties and hence human rights, make it the case that the law either turns pre-existing 
universal moral rights into human rights and hence actually makes them human 
37 One may think here of the moral rights mentioned by the 9th Amendment of the US Constitution. 
38 The legalization of pre-existing moral rights is rarely a mere rranslation; it usually specifies and somehow 






rights, or recognizes certain interests as sufficiemly fundamental to give rise to human 
rights and to universal moral rights at the same time. In the moral-political account of 
human rights proposed here, the legal recognition of a fundamental human interest, 
in conditions of political equality, is part of the creation of a moral-political human 
right. As a result, human rights cannot pre-exist their legalization as independent moral 
human rights, but, at the most, only as independent universal moral rights. Of course, 
the protected interests are universal moral interests that pre-exist legal recognition, 
but t~e human rights themselves do not pre-exist as such. 
Based on the moral-political account of human rights presented previously, rhe 
law provides the best and maybe the only way of mutually recognizing the soda-
comparative importance of those interests in a political community of equals.39 It 
enables the weighing of those interests against each other and the drawing of the 
political equality threshold or comparative line that is built into the relational nature 
of human rights. It also contributes to the evaluation of the standard threats against 
those interests in given socio-political circumstances. Moreover, the law and the insti-
tutions it constitutes allow for the specification and allocation of human rights duties 
and henc:e are part of the minimal conditions of abstract feasibility that apply to the 
recognition of human rights. Because, following Joseph Raz, one may consider that 
"there is no prescribed allocation [of responsibility, S.B.] independently of existing 
practices and expectations" (Raz 2013), there can be no abstract rights in the absence 
of a possible allocation of duties and hence of institutions and a legal framework to 
do so. Finally, the law also contributes to the public justification and hence to· the 
democratic legitimacy of the individual rights it recognizes as human rights. 
In short, the law makes universal moral rights human rights, either by recognizing 
them as legal rights or by creating them in recognizing certain fundamental interests 
as soda-comparatively important: it is an integral part of their institutional and 
relational nature. Its role cannot, as a result, merely be reduced to one among many 
means of enforcement of pre-existing universal moral rights. This understanding of the 
relationship between moral and legal human rights is one of mutuality. It goes beyond · 
the traditional understanding of a unilateral relationship of translation-transposition-
enforcement of moral rights through legal rights. 
39 See e.g. Cohen 2008: 599-600; Forst 2010; Forst 1999: 48-50. See even Pogge 2005: 3 fn. 26, who 
~nced:s this point in the case of civil and political rights. It seems, however, that the egalitarian 
dimensiOn of human rights and hence their inherently legal nature would apply even more to the case 
of social and economic rights. 
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4. Human Rights Theory qua Legal Theory 
I argued in the first section that human rights theory ought to account for our con-
temporary human rights practice qua practice in which human rights law plays a 
central role. This point has been confirmed now that the moral-political and hence 
legal nature of human rights has been uncovered. It follows, I explained, that human 
rights theorizing should start from human rights law qua normative practice where 
the law entails the reflexive moral resources and standards for its own moral justifi-
cation and critique. This in turn means that human rights theory is most at home 
within legal theory. The last step in the argument is to delve deeper into the method 
of human rights theory, and, more specifically, to explain how we should go about 
doing human rights theory qua legal theory. 
In a nutshell, I would like to argue that the legal theory of human rights has the 
benefits of both "practical" and "ethical" human rights theorizing. On the one hand, 
it starts from the legal practice and is non-ideal, but because it focuses on the law in 
the practice, on the other, it is not blind to the moral dimension of human rights and 
is not static and conservative as a result. Taking the legal dimension of human rights 
seriously gets us past the sterile opposition between those two approaches and allows 
us to resort to the essential methodological resources of legal philosophy. 
The method for the legal theorizing ofhuman rights I propose draws from analytical 
legal philosophy and, more particularly, from theories of normative positivism and in 
particular from strands of both the legal philosophy of Joseph Raz on the normativiry 
of law and legal rights (see e.g. Raz 2010b; Raz 2013) and that ofJeremy Waldron 
on legal interpretation (see e.g. Waldron 2012). The aim is to link those acquis in 
jurisprudence with the methodological proposals made by non-ideal and institutional 
political theorists like Allen Buchanan (see e.g. Buchanan 2008). This should help 
focus the latter institutional human rights theories even more on the law and help them 
work out the way in which human rights law provides its own human rights critique. 40 
The main characteristics of the proposed method are the following. First, human 
rights theory needs to start with the hard questions raised by the legal practice of 
human rights, and not with those identified by moral philosophers. This should bring 
to the fore some' questions that have not been addressed by human rights theorists so 
40 Buchanan 2013b's book project on the legality of human rights does not go far enough in this respect 
to the extent that it purports to provide a moral evaluation and justification of the international human 
rights legal system, and not to explain how that evaluation and justification is internal to the legal 





far. One example is the issue of restrictions to human rights, not only in the context 
of conflicts of human rights, but also of those restrictions based on public interest 
and other moral considerations. Other examples are the issue of the cost of human 
rights and the ~location of human rights duties in practice, that of the stringency of 
human· rights that is everywhere held to be specially strong by moral philosophers, 
but never found to be enforced as such in practice, or the question of vulnerability 
that is central to the structure of human rights in practice, but remains strangely 
undertheorized. A final instance is jurisdiction qua condition for the recognition of 
int~rnational human rights in practice (see e.g. Article 1 ECHR), and hence of their 
applicability-to the relationship between a given right-holder and a given duty-bearer. 
Second, human rights theory should not take human rights law only as a starting 
point, but also as an object of justification and a source of critique at the same time. 
Legal human rights theory does not take human rights practice at face value as a given, 
but also criticizes it albeit without disparaging it as soon it does not fit an a priori moral 
vision. This e~bles human rights theory to avoid the Charybda of conservatism one 
observes in many "political" accounts ofhuman rights that are too faithful to the existing 
practice, on the one hand, and the Scylla of revisionism one notes in many "ethical" 
accounts that are too prone to distance themselves from the practice and suggest reforms 
from an Archimedean point of view, on the other. Of course, the balance is not easy 
to keep and the interpretive constraints·difficult to identifY with precision. The legal 
practice of human rights may not always be morally correct and moral disagreements 
are often patent within it, but the chosen routes may sometimes be legitimate even 
so due, for instance, to the epistemological or social constraints that were respected 
in the light of the existence of widespread and intractable moral disagreement. This is 
particularly the case of judicial reasoning over human rights: it ought not be conflated 
with moral reasoning over universal moral rights, and hence ought not be judged 
merely by those standards (see Waldron 2009a; Sadurski 2009; and Waldron 2009b, 
also Raz 2001). Such an approach would not pay sufficient attention to the social moral 
epistemological resources of legal institutions in the human rights interpretation and 
enforcement process (see e.g. Buchanan 2008). For instance, even though the way in 
which the judicial practice of human rights by and large settles human rights conflicts 
by balancing and, more particularly, by balancing interests and hence seems prima facie 
to falling prey to an utilitarian quantification, disparaging that practice and the pro-
portionality principle out of hand merely on abstract moral grounds does not account 
for that practice's moral contribution and to the other moral considerations at play 
within the law to both criticize and potentially reform that process. 
Hintergrund I Besson 
Besides taking the law seriously and drawing on the resources of analytical juris-
prudence, the proposed legal theory of human rights has many advantages for our 
understanding of human rights when compared with other human rights theories 
currently available. 
First of all, it is a better guide of the practice and a better resource for its potential 
reforms: it helps understand how the practice actually already has the resources to 
reform itself and can enable practitioners and philosophers alike to tap on them. 
Secondly, given the dose relationship between legal theory and practice, legal human 
rights' theorizing places the theorist at the core of the human rights practice and helps 
understand its central role in the organization of the practice. Understanding the role 
of legal theory and one's philosophical approach to the law more generally prevents 
philosophers from giving too much weight to the views of some lawyers over others, 
for instance. Further, considering human rights theory as legal theory should also help 
distilling proposals much more effectively among lawyers and hence contributing to 
the outreach of human rights theorizing in the legal practice. 
Thirdly, legal human rights theorizing may help connecting philosophical approaches 
to human rights to other disciplinary approaches such as human rights history in 
particular. The law contains its own intellectual and institutional history within its 
norms and is much more historical to that extent than morality. Legal human rights 
theorizing can therefore account for change and progress within human rights much 
better than abstract moral theorizing that cannot explain change (e.g. in moral interests 
that remain the same across time and history) (see Besson/Zysset 2012). Furthermore, 
a legal approach to human rights helps make a virtue out of the institutionalization 
and hence relative contingency of human rights rather than a defect. Human rights 
indeed require institutions for their duties to be specified and allocated and hence 
for the rights to be recognized in the first place, and this in turn implies recognizing 
their contingent and dynamic nature, something that accounts of human rights qua 
moral rights cannot grasp (see Lafont 2012). Finally, devising a legal theory of human 
rights can provide a welcome contribution to the methodological debate in human 
rights research more generally. Research about human rights has indeed been con-
ducted without much self-reflection about method and ways of combining different 
methodological approaches. For instance, understanding human rights history as 
legal history may constitute a way of tying in human rights history more closely to 
normative human rights theorizing (see Besson/Zysset 2012). 
Las but not least, the proposed legal theory of human rights ought to be distinguis-
hed from other existing legal theories of human rights, and in particular from Robert 
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Alexy's theory of fundamental rights, Carl Wellman's theoryofhuman rights and Ronald 
Dworkin's human rights' account (see Alexy 2009; Wellman 201 0; Dworkin 2011 ). 
Besides being (ocused only on domestic human rights, Alexy's theory of fundamental 
rights, first of all, works very differently from the proposed one. It works as a syste-
matic reconstruction of the practice, and in particular of the German constitutional 
practice. That systematic modellization of a practice is then generalized and regarded 
as re-exportable. There is no trace of a critique of the existing human rights practice 
in Ale_:o/s theory, and even less of a discussion of the human rights law-immanent and 
self-reflexive critique. Carl Wellman's theory ofhuman rights, secondly, starts from an 
observation totally opposite to mine: according to him, the 'moral underpinnings of 
legal human rights are not sufficiently explicit in recent human rights theorizing and 
need to be accounted for. Unlike the hereby proposed theory, Wellman's sees current 
human rights theorizing as under-moralized and aims at remedying this. His theory 
is not interested therefore in the ways in which the law includes moral doctrines and 
principles and affects moral normativity and hence is actually essential to the moral 
dimension of human rights, and not just an add-on to a set of moral human rights 
with an independent moral existence. In short, Wellman underestimates the reciprocity 
of the reiationship between universal moral rights and legal human rights. Finally, 
the proposed legal theory of human rights comes dose in its interpretive dimension 
to Ronald Dworkin's recent account of human rights. Where they differ, however, 
is in relation to international human rights law and its differences from domestic 
human rights law. Those differences hinder a mere transposition of one's theory of 
constitutional rights to human rights (see e.g. Letsas 2009). But, most importantly 
f:rom a methodological perspective, our divergence lies in the non-positivist flavour 
of Dworkin's account and his heightened conflation oflaw and morality. 
Conclusion 
This article's concern has been primarily meta-theoretical, and its question was: what 
should be the nature of human rights theory? Curiously, human rights theorists have 
neglected this primary step and initial theoretical move of identifying and explaining 
what their theory is a theory of and what kind of theory it should be. 
I have argued we should take the legal dimension of human rights more seriously. 
This has both a substantive advantage and a methodological one. First of all, un-
derstanding the legal dimension of human rights makes for a richer understanding 
of the nature of human rights themselves, and hence of all the other questions in 
Hintergrund l Bess . ..:.on:..:__ _ 
human rights theory, such as the justification of human rights in particular. A second 
benefit of taking the legal dimension of human rights seriously is that human rights 
theorizing can be done as legal theorizing and tap on the resources of jurisprudence 
and analytical legal philosophy. 
This substantive and methodological proposal comes at the right time. Current 
human rights theorizing has locked itself in a dead-end through a self-imposed division 
between "political" and "ethical" accounts. That division has become largely sterile. 
Most recent commentators ~ecommend combining the subs~tive and methodological 
strengths ofboth approaches. Seeing human rights as "legal" and human rights theory 
as "legal" does not only help in combining most effectively the benefits of political 
and ethical accounts of human rights. It also opens up new lines of questioning and 
enquiring about our contemporary human rights practice that go well beyond what 
political and moral theories of human rights can offer. 
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